Maxine K. Blackburn v. Terrell M. Blackburn : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
Maxine K. Blackburn v. Terrell M. Blackburn : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Earl Jay Peck; Attorney for RespondentCraig Stephens Cook;
Attorney for Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Blackburn v. Blackburn, No. 16651 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1941
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MAXINE K. BLACKBURN, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. No. 16651 
TERRELL M. BLACKBURN, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge 
Earl Jay Peck 
Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
CRAIG STEPP.ENS COOK 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attorney for Appellant 
F 11. i:-
NOV 2 8 1979 
__ ................ . 
' Clark. Supreme Court, ut<ib 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MAXINE K. BLACKBURN, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
TERRELL M. BLACKBURN, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
No. 16651 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge 
Earl Jay Peck 
Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
CRAIG STEPHENS COOK 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attorney for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Cases Cited ..•. 
Other Authorities. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
STAYING EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT INDEFI-
NITELY AND SUCH ORDER SHOULD BE VACATED • 
. ii 
ii 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Bates v. Bates, 560 P.2d 706 (Utah 1977) . 
Palmquist v. Palmquist, 312 P.2d 779 (Utah 
1957) .•..... 
Seeley v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975) 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Rule 62(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ii 
4' 8 
s, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MAXINE K. BLACKBURN, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
TERRELL M. BLACKBURN, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 16651 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Third 
District Court, the Honorable Dean E. Conder presiding, in 
which Plaintiff-Appellant sought judgment for delinquent child 
support in the amount of $2,425.00 and in which Defendant 
sought to reduce his monthly obligation of child support from 
$125 to $100 per month per child. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was heard on July 18, 1979 before the Honor-
able Dean E. Conder. At the conclusion of the testimony of 
Defendant the trial court entered judgment against Defendant 
and in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $2,425 which re-
presented delinquent child support payments due and owing 
through April of 1979. (R., p. 27). 
The court also reduced Defendant's obligation from $125 
per month per child to $100 per month per child. CR., P· 27) • 
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At the conclusion of the hearing upon the t' cour s own mo-
tion the delinquent child support judgment was suspended until 
such time as Defendant became delinquent for a period of two 
months at which time the suspension would be withdrawn. ( R., 
pp. 2 7- 2 8 : 41- 4 2) • 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks dismissal of the stay granted by the trial 
court as to the delinquent payments and seeks attorney's fees 
for this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and defendant were married and lived in Tex· 
as. In June of 1971 a divorce decree was entered by the Court 
of Domestic Relations of Harris County, Texas. The decree 
stated that Defendant was to pay the sum of $250 per month as 
child support. (R., p. 18). 
Defendant failed to meet this obligation and an action was 
commenced by Plaintiff in the State of Utah on May 17, 1979 for 
the delinquency of $2,425 (R., p. 2). 
Defendant filed his answer denying the amount of arrearage 
and requesting modification of the monthly child support paymen: 
(R. I pp. 12-14). 
The matter was heard on July 18, 1979 before the Honorat:: 
C d A Short hearing was held with the defendant Dean E. on er. 
testifying as to his financial status. The judgment in the 
amount of $2, 425 was stipulated to by the parties and the cour: 
-2-
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ordered a judgment in that amount. However, the court also upon 
its own motion made the following Order: 
I'm going to order Mr. Blackburn to pay 
$200 per month for the support of the chil-
dren and suspend the collection on the ar-
rearage as long as he keeps those payments 
current. 
Now, if you get behind, Mr. Blackburn, 
more than two payments, then the suspen-
sion is off and they can come after you 
for the full arrearage. I want to use 
that as kind of a club to keep you making 
these payments. (R., pp. 41-42). 
The court then reduced the total monthly obligation from 
$250 to $200 and then stated the following: 
And by doing it that way, then it would 
make it $200 a month on the current and 
nothing on the arrearage unless you get 
behind. That will help Mrs. Black.burn also. 
Plaintiff's attorney then asked if a judgment for the arrearage 
would be entered. The court then replied: 
Oh yes. You have your judgment for that 
amount, but suspended any collection of it 
as long as he is making payments. If he 
fails to make payments, then he is going to 
face the consequences. Very well. That 
will be the order. (R., p. 42). 
A judgment and order were entered on July 30, 1979. (R., 
pp. 27-28). It is from this order and judgment that this appeal 
is taken. (R., p. 31). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
STAYING EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT INDEFIN-
ITELY AND SUCH ORDER SHOULD BE VACATED. 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant will concede that the trial court is vested 
with discretion in deciding numerous matters concerning the sut· 
sequent modification of a divorce decree. Appellant, for ex-
ample, does not dispute the trial court's order reducing the 
monthly child support obligation based upon the circumstances 
of the defendant at the time of the hearing. Of course, Appel· 
lant may later request this amount to be increased when Defen-
dant's circumstances improve. In any case, however, such a 
decision rests with the discretion of the court. 
However, the indefinite staying of the delinquent judgmen: 
by the trial court was clearly an abuse of discretion. This 
Court has held that installments of alimony become vested when 
they become due and that a court has no power to modify the de· 
cree as to them. In Bates v. Bates, 560 P.2d 706 (Utah 19771 
this Court held that the trial court erred in refusing to red'c' 
accrued and unpaid alimony installments to judgment. 
The court in this case effectively committed the same err:: 
as in the Bates case since effectively the judgment granted by 
the court may never be enforceable assuming that the defendant 
meets his present obligation. 
The stay of execution in this case is particularly dett~ 
Perl.. od of 1; ~i· tat ions upon a ti):. mental in that the eight-year ~ .. 
judgment applies to delinquent support. Seeley v. Park, 5Jl f 
684 (Utah 1975). Thus, at the termination of eight years pli;" 
. ·c-· 
tiff would have the burden of attempting to preserve any JU' 
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ment existing against.the defendant and, under the court's or-
der, would not even be entitled to the statutory interest which 
would be applicable to a judgment which is in full force and 
effect. 
This court in a similar case has previously held that a 
stay such as this is unwarranted. In Palmquist v. Palmquist, 
312 P.2d 779 (Utah 1957) a judgment was entered by the trial 
court for a delinquency amount. However the judgment also pro-
vided that execution should not issue on such judgment until 
expiration of ten days after its entry to give the defendant 
opportunity to commence an aceion against the plaintiff for al-
leged damages on a cause of action for withholding certain ti-
tle papers on a horse. 
Appellant claimed that the trial court erred in staying 
execution on the judgment since there was no statutory or equi-
table grounds which justified the court's discretion. This 
Court noted that Rule 62(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure allows the court discretionary power to stay judgment but 
this Court noted that some showing of circumstances must be con-
tained in the record to justify such a stay. As noted by this 
Court: 
We shall assume, however, that equitable 
grounds for granting a stay of execution 
may be invoked. See 33 C.J.S. Executions 
Section 139, p. 313. We find none such 
in this case. The defendant asserted that 
he had an unliquidated claim for damages 
for withholding of title papers to the 
-s-
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horse. Nothing further was shown. That 
he would be in any way irreparably injured 
were execution to issue, that the defen-
dant was insolvent, was about to depart 
from the jurisdiction, or any other ground 
except the bare assertion of an unliquida-
ted claim does not appear. 
Equitable relief from the enforcement of a 
judgment is not granted on the grounds 
that the parties have cross demands, merely, 
but rather that some injustice would result 
were execution not stayed. Id. at 780. 
In the Palmquist case this Court struck down a stay of 
only ten days. In the present case the stay granted by the 
trial court could last indefinitely as long as Defendant does 
not fall two payments behind in his support. In addition, 
Plaintiff is suffering a financial loss in that the stay of 
the execution prevents the accrual of the statutory interest 
which would otherwise be applicable against Defendant. 
The record is void of any showing which would justify 
a stay in this case. The stay was granted entirely on the 
court's own motion since no demand was sought by the defendant. 
The only reason given by the trial court was that the stay 
would act as "a kind of a club to keep you making these pay-
ments." (R. I p. 42). 
In effect, then, if Defendant maintains the obligation 
which by court order he is required to do he is essentially for· 
given of his past transgressions and Plaintiff is denied t~ 
'c 
opportunity to collect money which is rightfully due and owin, 
to her. 
ld ' 
The "club" which the trial court referred to shoU · 
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Defendant's fear of being held in contempt of court rather 
than the incentive of allowing Defendant to escape an obliga-
tion of the past by maintaining a present obligation. 
In conclusion, Appellant submits that there is no equita-
ble or legal justification for the granting of this perpetual 
stay and that an injustice is actually resulting against Plain-
tiff who is unable presently to seek collection of this past 
amount or to even negotiate with Defendant as to how such amount 
should be satisfied. Under the present circumstances, moreover, 
Defendant is given a lag period of two months of delinquency 
before any penalty attaches. Thus, as long as he is only 1-1/2 
months behind his payments at any given time the suspension is 
not vacated. Such a lag obviously creates a hardship on the 
part of Plaintiff who has no effective tool to require prompt 
payment. 
Finally, the court's order of stay places the expense and 
burden upon Plaintiff to go back to court and to prove that a 
delinquency of two months had occurred in order to vacate the 
trial court's suspension. Again, such a burden is an obvious 
injustice and hardship upon the plaintiff who is the innocent 
party in this dispute. 
The order of the trial court in indefinitely suspending a 
judgment based upon delinquent child support was clearly an a-
buse of discretion and a patently erroneous order. For this 
-7-
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reason, Appellant should be entitled to a reasonable attorney'; 
fee fof prosecution of this appeal. Bates v. Bates, 560 P.~ 
706 (Utah 1977). 
Respectfully submitted, 
-8-
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